Why the U.S. and Iran are Struggling to Reach a Deal
Ali Vaez with Esfandyar Batmanghelidj - Season 3, Episode 10
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In late February, the United States and Israel launched a war on Iran—a war that killed the country’s supreme leader, closed the Strait of Hormuz, pushed the global economy to the brink, and brought the Middle East closer to all-out conflagration than at any point in a generation.
Now, amid a ceasefire that has held without ever being formalized, a draft framework for a comprehensive agreement between Washington and Tehran is reportedly taking shape. The deal that emerges—if it emerges at all—will make clear limits of sanctions pressure, the price of war, and whether transformative diplomacy between the U.S. and Iran is even possible.
In this episode, Ali Vaez helps make sense of the ongoing negotiations. Ali is Senior Adviser to the President and Project Director for Iran at the International Crisis Group. He is one of the foremost experts on the Iran nuclear file, having spent the better part of fifteen years in direct contact with Western, regional, and Iranian officials, and among a long list of other achievements he is a co-author of the excellent book How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare.
Season 3 of The Sanctions Age is produced by media.winter in Berlin.
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Esfandyar’s Reflections
For more than a decade, I have had the privileged of attending a wide range of public and private meetings alongside Ali. In each of these settings, I have been able to witness his razor sharp thinking on the challenges facing U.S.-Iran diplomacy. Getting a durable deal between Washington and Tehran is like a puzzle, one that evolves and gets harder with time. Few people have proposed more creative solutions to that puzzle than Ali. His policy recommendations are not always heeded, but they do always push policymakers to reconsider the path that they find themselves on. This work is inherent to the mission of the International Crisis Group, which is a foremost a peace-building organization. For Ali and his colleagues, the inherent value of a U.S.-Iran deal is that it forestalls further conflict.
The mission of peace-building and the urgency of a diplomatic solution for the Iran nuclear crisis is even clearer in the aftermath of the Forty Day war. But as Ali explains during our conversation, while the war may make diplomacy more necessary, its fallout has also made negotiations more fraught. I agree with Ali’s assessment that a broader deal is unlikely to materialize, even if the two side can agree on a framework agreement that extends the ceasefire and opens the door to more talks. But I am glad that we could end our discussion with a bit of optimism, pointing to the remarkable role that regional diplomacy has played in staving off a deeper crisis.
Episode Transcript
Esfandyar
Welcome to The Sanctions Age, the podcast that explores how sanctions are changing the world. My name is Esfandyar Batmanghelidj. In late February, the United States and Israel launched a war on Iran, a war that killed the country’s supreme leader, closed the Strait of Hormuz, pushed the global economy to the brink, and brought the Middle East closer to an all-out conflagration than at any point in a generation.
Now, amid a ceasefire that is held without ever being formalized, a draft framework for a comprehensive agreement between Washington and Tehran is reportedly taking shape. The deal that emerges, if it emerges at all, will make clear the limits of sanctions pressure, the price of war, and whether transformative diplomacy between the US and Iran is even possible.
To help us make sense of the ongoing negotiations, I’m joined today by Ali Vaez. Ali is Senior Advisor to the President and Project Director for Iran at the International Crisis Group. He’s one of the foremost experts on the Iran nuclear file, having spent the better part of 15 years in direct contact with Western, regional, and Iranian officials. Among a long list of other achievements, he is a co-author of the excellent book, How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare.
Ali, welcome to the show.
Ali
Thank you, Yar. It’s great to be with you. I’ve been an avid listener of this podcast, so it’s an honor to be finally on.
Esfandyar
I’m delighted to hear that. There’s a lot to discuss today, and I really couldn’t think of anyone better to give us a run-through of these negotiations. Before we focus the conversation on the talks currently underway between the US and Iran, I wanted to maybe step back and give our listeners a little bit of background on how we arrived at this point.
The Iran nuclear negotiations began in earnest way back in 2003, when the E3: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, sought a deal to limit Iran’s nuclear development. Can we start by you giving us an overview of what first spurred the concerns of Iran’s nuclear program and how Western governments sought to mitigate that threat? What was it about the nuclear deal that was reached in 2015 that made it such a significant achievement?
Ali
Sure. Happy to do so. In 2003, it was revealed by an Iranian opposition group, probably information that was provided to it by a foreign intelligence organization, that Iran had a secret nuclear weapons program. There were sites that were not declared to the IAEA. There were all sorts of nuclear activities, centrifuge-related, heavy water reactor, heavy water production, and so on, that were not declared. This was around the time that the US had invaded Iraq based on a pretext of Iraq having weapons of mass destruction program.
This sparked an international non-proliferation crisis. Out of fear that the US might, after invading Afghanistan and Iraq, would go to Iran next, the Europeans decided to proactively pursue a diplomatic process to try to resolve this problem.
In October 2003, they reached an understanding with Iran in which Iran agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment program for a period of time until they can get to an agreement in which Iran would be provided with economic incentives in return for restrictions and transparency measures imposed on its nuclear program.
That deal was in place until the spring of 2005, when it fell apart because the Europeans couldn’t really deliver on their end of the bargain. The reason was that the US was not on board with providing Iran with economic incentives for anything less than Iran agreeing to zero enrichment, completely abandoning any access to nuclear fuel cycle technology.
That sparked a period of confrontation that I call the race of sanctions against centrifuges. The US and, in fact, the rest of the global powers started imposing international, multilateral, and unilateral sanctions on Iran, which really peaked around 2012. In that period, Iran started ratcheting up its nuclear program. By the time that we got to serious diplomacy again in 2013, which first led to an interim agreement in November of that year, and then to a comprehensive agreement in July of 2015, Iran already had almost an industrial-scale enrichment program and was enriching to 20%, which is considered pretty close to weapons-grade.
The most important thing about the deal in 2015 was that it was based on the same model of the 2003 Tehran Declaration Agreement, meaning that at its core was this basic formula of restrictions and transparency measures in return for economic incentives.
Of course, the latter end of the bargain had changed because it was no longer about positive economic incentives, but about mostly about removing sanctions. What was really different about this agreement was the degree of detail that went into it. It was a 159-page-long agreement, basically leaving no stone unturned just to make sure that all pathways to nuclear weapons were blocked for a long period of time. Some of the most important restrictions on the program were supposed to remain in place until 2031, when they started to sunset and expire.
Also, sanctions relief was very, very detailed. It was the first time that the US and Iran had negotiated an agreement of this degree of detail and in a win-win manner in direct negotiation. There were lots of things that were new about it. Of course, that agreement also didn’t last because the Trump administration, that came in about a year after this deal went into full implementation, called it one of the worst deals ever negotiated, and eventually, we drew from it in 2018.
Esfandyar
Ali, that was the big fateful decision that basically got us to the crisis point that we’re at today. The Trump administration, despite what you describe as being this very long, technical, detailed, and carefully negotiated deal, calls the deal a bad one and decides to withdraw.
I think even more importantly, they don’t just withdraw from the deal, but they to begin this policy of maximum pressure, so really imposing all of the sanctions that had been removed as part of the nuclear agreement in 2015, 2016, but then also adding new sanctions to try and ratchet up the pressure on Iran’s economy, in addition to other escalatory steps that the administration took.
The crisis that we see today flows directly from that decision. In your view, why was it that the Trump administration walked away from a deal that was widely seen as working? What was it that the architects of this maximum pressure policy expected to achieve by moving away from a diplomatic agreement towards a new phase of pressure?
Ali
Look, the core criticism of the opponents of the JCPOA, the 2015 deal, was that President Obama prematurely removed the pressure. If he had kept Iran under really strangulating pressure that it was on with its currency devaluation, its high inflation, high unemployment rates, Iran would eventually have capitulated to US terms.
Instead of a deal that would allow Iran to have still enrichment on its soil, even though with all the restrictions and transparency measures that I described, it would have agreed to give away the whole program. The concept was that if the Trump administration comes back in and not just restores the pressure, but takes it to new heights, this is why it was called maximum pressure, it would do the magic trick of bringing Iran to its knees.
The JCPOA lifted about 750 sanctions designations. The Trump administration not only restored those designations but added another 750 on top of them. The Biden administration then came in on the promise of lifting those sanctions and restoring the JCPOA, but added another 500 on top of it. The process continues to this day, and Iran still has not capitulated.
If you ask, again, the opponents of the JCPOA, they will still say that we are one screwdriver turned away from Iran, surrendering to US terms. Whereas the entire concept, I think, is flawed and misguided because it’s a weaker party if you validate the pressure tool in the hands of the stronger party, then there is no end to that stronger party using that tool against you. It will become a slippery slope from the perspective of Iranian leadership. That’s why, regardless of the degree of pressure or pain that they’re tolerating, they would never consider capitulation to US terms that they believe is more dangerous than suffering the consequences of US coercion, whether it’s economic or military.
That was the concept. For a while, by the way, I have to admit that the pressure was more effective than many expected. Some of the proponents of diplomacy believe that pressure would only work if it’s multilateral, not just unilateral US sanctions. Iran would have ways to go around sanctions if the rest of the world is not on board with such a pressure campaign. But by May of 2019, the Trump administration had managed to bring down Iranian oil exports from about 2.5 million barrels a day to under 100,000 barrels. Yet, again, Iran didn’t even consider making the concessions that the Trump administration had in mind.
This takes us to this second experience sanctions in which the natural progression of pressure policy. When sanctions don’t work, you’re left only with another course of tool, which is the use of the threat of use of military force, and then the limited use of military force, and then the comprehensive use of military force. All of those things still have not produced the intended result.
Esfandyar
Ali, I want to go back to this discussion of what leverage the two sides are able to bring to bear on one another and how that’s factoring into the negotiations. We’ll do that in the context of discussing the talks that are currently taking place.
You did mention the Biden administration in your response just now, and I think we should maybe expand on that a little bit because that was a moment where it did seem like despite the fact that Biden maintained pressure on Iran, as you described, and despite the concerns on the Iranian side that the US was not really committed to restoring the nuclear deal, they did get very close to an agreement.
In the late summer of 2022, there was a text on the table where basically the technical side of the diplomatic agreement had been agreed by both sets of negotiators that were meeting in Vienna. You’ve written a lot about the difference between having a technically viable agreement and the political will to actually conclude the agreement.
In the end, there wasn’t a deal during the Biden years. Why is it that the US and Iran could converge on the substance of a deal, technically speaking, but still fail to actually get that deal over the line? What does that tell us, let’s say, the experience in the Biden years, about one of these fundamental challenges for this diplomacy that is underway right now?
Ali
That’s a very good question. Look, you need a combination of political will and also technical expertise to get to the finish line in these kinds of negotiations, because we’re talking about an issue that at its core is very technical, but every layer of it is wrapped in politics, domestic politics, both in Tehran and Washington, and also to a degree in European capitals in Jerusalem.
In the case of the Biden administration, I’ve always argued that they’re responsible for the failure of talks in 2021 when they came to office because there was a decision that they’re not going to take any political risk on Iran. They had other priorities at home. They had a laser-thin margin in the Senate and Iran was a controversial issue. They decided to posture and delay.
Of course, for the Iranians who expected the same people who negotiated the JCPOA were the critiques of maximum pressure to get back into the deal. When they didn’t, it really burned through whatever trust remained between the two sides and resulted in the Iranians hardening their position.
There was also a change in the political situation in Iran. The President who had negotiated the 2015 deal, President Rouhani, left office, and a very hard-line President, Raisi, came into office, empowering hard-line negotiators who, again, just like their American counterparts, believe that the reason the deal wasn’t good enough was that their predecessors were too soft on the United States and had made too many compromises, and so they hardened their position.
Then a series of unfortunate things happened, including the war in Ukraine, in which Iran provided military supports to Russia, and that hardened the European position. They no longer were really interested in providing Iran with additional financial resources in the form of sanctions relief. Then the Women Life Freedom protest happened in Iran and made it politically toxic for the Biden administration to do so.
On the technical side, there were also some remaining differences. It’s like where we are right now. The other day, a Trump administration official said about 95% of the text of the agreement that Iran and the US are negotiating is done. The devil is really in that 5%.
I remember I asked one of the French negotiators to send me a copy of the title of what they were negotiating in Vienna to restore the JCPOA, this 27-page document, and he covered it with one of the letterheads of the Quba Palace where the negotiations were taking place, where you can only see the top part. The top part said, “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”
Not everything was agreed to in these negotiations. There were still some differences, key among them, the fact that the Iranians demanded US guarantees. If they get back into the deal, the US would not once again renege on its commitments as Trump did in 2018.
Unfortunately, there was no legal or political mechanism that could provide that guarantee. This remained a contentious issue, and one of the reasons that the parties were not able to cross the finish line until the political ground under their feet basically completely shifted and made it impossible to finalize the agreement.
Esfandyar
The shifting political ground obviously made it impossible for a deal to come together during the Biden years. But it is remarkable that early last year, the Trump administration was engaged in negotiations with Iran, and everything that had happened that created mistrust between the two sides, that was still not in and of itself something that was preventing the idea of diplomatic engagement between the US and Iran.
Thinking back to last year before the June war, and this moment where it did seem like there was some optimism that Trump, despite being the person who tore up the nuclear deal, might finally be ready to strike a new one, what was it about that moment that made things feel optimistic? How close were we to an agreement before Israel decided to launch a military campaign against Iran?
Is the fact that Israel decided to launch that campaign evidence that an agreement was actually pretty close? Or was it, as some figures in Iran have suggested, evidence that US was never really committed to those talks succeeding and was just trying to ratchet up the pressure towards military escalation in the way you described earlier?
Ali
To be honest, my views about this have evolved over the past few months as I’ve learned more and more about it, about what went on at the negotiating table from people who were there and who left the Trump administration or some of the mediators.
It does appear to me that the Trump administration really didn’t know what it was doing. It didn’t have a strategy. It wanted to test the waters to see if it could get a deal, but it really didn’t even know what a deal it wanted. They started on very optimistic terms. Steve Witkoff, the chief negotiator, when he was told that Iran was willing to bring down the level of enrichment from 60%, which is 99% of the way to weapons-grade, to below 3.67%, he thought that was a major achievement.
On an interview he did on US television, which created a major backlash in the US, literally, I think more than 100 Republican members of Congress wrote a letter to the White House demanding that the US should not agree to anything less than zero enrichment or anything more than zero enrichment.
But in any case, that just demonstrated that someone like Witkoff really had no idea what the JCPOA was, what would be acceptable set of criteria for the United States.
I remember in 2013, Wendy Sherman, who was the chief US negotiator, had asked her team to prepare a draft of what an agreement would be acceptable to the United States as the basis from which the US team could negotiate and reach the middle ground. At least you knew in detail what is it that would be acceptable to you.
The Trump negotiators had no idea, really. Was that really all a subterfuge or just the amateurish way that they approach the negotiation? It’s still hard to say, but I do believe that there was a genuine effort to see if they could get a deal, but a deal that could be characterized more or less as zero-sum and simplistic. At some point, Steve Witkoff, for instance, had offered the Iranians to buy out their nuclear program as if this was a real estate deal.
That’s the negotiation that both, I think in 2025 and in 2026, was not going to succeed. I also put some of the blame for this on the Iranian side because they still negotiated as if they were negotiating with the Obama administration or with the Trump administration, not realizing that the technical approach to the negotiation is not going to work with the new crowd, and they needed to engage more in the performance of diplomacy that some other countries in the world had deployed with the Trump administration and had produced much better results. Again, hard to read intentions. I think as one of the members of Witkoff’s team at the time, told me these were not professional negotiations, but they were serious.
Esfandyar
I think that distinction that you can have negotiations that are serious but not professional, that really gets at the heart of the challenge of maybe engaging the Trump administration diplomatically, whether on this issue or any number of issues, many of which we’ve discussed on the podcast. It does sound like, obviously, the two sides struggle to find mutually compatible strategy for the talks, whether we’re looking at the negotiations before the June war last year or the negotiations before the war that started in late February.
Of course, where we are now is the two sides are back in negotiations after roughly 40 days of fighting, in which the US did really take this landmark move, historic move to embark on a major military operation against Iran. Then we’ve had 50 days around this fragile, never formalized ceasefire. Based on everything we’ve discussed so far, this is the fourth time that the two sides are at the negotiating table since maximum pressure resumed in 2018.
Are we in a situation now where, because of the outcomes of this war, there has been a substantive change in either the leverage that both sides are bringing to the table or the motivations for the two sides to engage in these negotiations? Do you see that the conditions now are a little bit more conducive for talks coming together than maybe they had been in the previous attempts?
Ali
Another very tough question. From what I see, I feel the leverage has certainly changed in the sense that Iran’s leverage is no longer just nuclear. It also is the Strait of Hormuz, which was a superpower. The geography had granted Iran, but Iran had never really deployed until this conflict, and that has changed the stakes and has changed the balance of power in these negotiations.
In a way, US leverage has diminished because the threat of use of force, which was always on the table when the Obama administration was negotiating, when the Biden administration was negotiating, even Trump’s first term, has now come to pass. It has materialized, and the Islamic Republic has survived it. It is not as much of a tool to put pressure on Iran as was the case in the past. It is exactly like the threat of use of sanctions. When you threaten, you have leverage, but when you impose, it’s already sunk cost. Then removing it and rolling back the clock becomes so much more difficult. I think this applies to military action as well.
I don’t see necessarily that the US side has now come to the conclusion that, “Okay, we have tried every tool of coercion. It hasn’t produced the outcome that we had in mind. Iran is still not agreeing to zero enrichment, and therefore we need to adopt a different strategy.” I still don’t see it. Part of this, again, is unique to this administration because the Trump administration doesn’t really have a policy process in which lessons could be learned, and the policy direction could be altered. It’s more based on the president’s impulses or mood. I don’t necessarily see that this experience has informed the way the Trump administration is negotiating. It is still allergic to anything that sounds or looks like the JCPOA. It still very much would like to see a zero enrichment.
On the Iranian side, I think it has deepened their cynicism about the possibility of getting an agreement with the United States, and especially with this administration. This is why you see that they prioritize the urgent over the important, the urgent being ending the war and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, along with some degree of economic reprieve. I don’t think that the Iranian government truly believes that it can negotiate a very detailed agreement with the Trump administration. I just give you an example by pointing to one piece of this puzzle, and that’s the fate of the stockpile of highly-enriched uranium, about half a ton of 60 enriched uranium that President Trump calls nuclear dust.
To get this issue resolved, you need to negotiate a deal that would basically outline exactly who goes after and how you basically find this material, which is probably sitting under rubble in one of the sites that were bombed during the Twelve-Day War in 2025, how you excavate it out. Then you need to have a deal between Iran and the UN nuclear watchdog, IAEA, to negotiate how to do oversight over this process. There are some unexposed ordinances in that area. We’re talking about 5,000 pound bombs that would have to be neutralized. It’s a very complicated process.
Then you have to do accountancy. God forbid, if instead of 440 kilograms, you find only 400 kilograms, it’s a major crisis. A lot of the problems Iran has had with the IEA in the past have been about a few grams of unenriched uranium, dating back from pre-2003 when Iran had a nuclear weapons program. If you have about 40 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium missing, it would be a major issue.
Let’s say all of that is accounted for, then probably the agreement would be that part of this stockpile would be diluted in Iran and part of it would be shipped out to a third country. Probably in return for each installment that is disposed of, Iranians would need sanctions relief that is verifiable, very tangible and irreversible up front. All of that probably is going to take weeks to negotiate, months to implement. The Trump administration has repeatedly demonstrated it doesn’t have the patience, the discipline, the focus, the expertise that is required to negotiate this an agreement. This is why I’m afraid if we get some understanding, as both sides call it an MOU, a memorandum of understanding, to end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, even if it might have some outlines of the direction of travel on the nuclear front, it would never really translate into a comprehensive and sustainable nuclear agreement.
Esfandyar
Ali, I to unpack a little bit more about this decision to negotiate a framework agreement or a memorandum of understanding rather than to try and go for the full agreement right now. The one obvious reason might be, as you explained, the technical details of this deal are probably more difficult to hammer out than ever before because of what has transpired in Iran’s nuclear program, especially in the wake of the war, but then also the incredibly complex architecture of US sanctions. The decision that the Trump administration has taken to be open to a framework deal is interesting.
I remember that last year, you and I were involved in a process where we were trying to push regional governments that were trying to mediate between the US and Iran to prioritize a framework deal in order to create an opening for further negotiations. Can we talk a little bit about the logic of an interim agreement? Is it possible that once the two sides, if they’re able to get over their mutual cynicism or skepticism, get a framework agreement in place? Does that actually potentially change the atmospherics around these negotiations in a way that could make the technical side of things easier to handle?
Ali
Look, you negotiate a framework agreement when the issues on the table are so complicated and your positions in them are so far apart that you need a considerable amount of time to figure out where common ground and middle ground, in which the deal could take shape, is located. That’s why you agree to very broad outlines which buys diplomacy, time and space to hammer out the details.
This is not the reason a framework agreement is being negotiated right now. The main reason is that basically there is a very high degree of cynicism, especially on the Iranian side, on the possibility of ever reaching a comprehensive agreement. That’s why a framework deal that would just end a lose-lose dynamic for both sides is attractive, even if that doesn’t translate into a sustainable end game. That’s where the logic is. Of course, last year’s war ended with a ceasefire that was imposed by President Trump on Iran and Israel without any written terms, and obviously it resulted in a second round of hostilities. The Iranians did insist that this time around, they would not agree to a ceasefire unless it has very specific terms. The Iranians did want some a written understanding about ending the war and what would come next.
The Trump administration also now has an interest in some framework primarily because it’s interested in reopening the Strait of Hormuz and bringing down global energy prices. They tried, especially the Trump administration, to see if it was possible to put everything on a single page, an agreement that would very simply deprive Iran of the ability of enriching uranium ever in the future, and they did not succeed. Iran insisted that these things would have to be pursued in two different phases. Again, it’s also partly because from the Iranian perspective, both in June of 2025 and in February of 2026, they had worked on draft detailed proposals on how to resolve the nuclear program, and yet the US decided to bomb them in the middle of negotiation. What’s the point of, once again, pursuing a technical draft on nuclear concessions and sanctions relief if that doesn’t seem to be what satisfies the United States?
This is how the framework and this stage approach has come together. It does make logical sense, and it is the best off-ramp in a road that honestly should not have been taken, but we are where we are.
Esfandyar
Ali, the way you’re describing it, it seems like, to an extent, both sides would use the framework agreement to kick the can down the road. Then the question becomes, why would a framework agreement actually hold if the underlying issues haven’t really been addressed in the form of a much more elaborate diplomatic understanding? That brings us back to this question of leverage.
Let’s look at this from Washington’s perspective. If the Trump administration has had these maximal demands for Iran since its first term, since the policy was instituted 8 years ago to adopt maximum pressure, what is it about the current moment that would lead them to agree a framework deal, and then why would they not just reneg on that deal again and maybe resume the military conflict? Here I’m thinking about, obviously, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which you touched on, also something that we discussed in the episode with Eddie Fishman on the podcast last week.
It does seem like the costs of military conflict are maybe more clear to both sides than they have been in previous rounds of negotiation. Is that in and of itself going to be enough to make a framework agreement that doesn’t actually resolve a lot of the major underlying issues hold up for the remainder of Trump’s term or for the coming years in which Iran is going to still face significant political, let’s say, uncertainty domestically?
Ali
Yes. As I said, I think the realization that the current situation is lose-lose, that although both sides have leverage over one another, but they’re also paying a very high cost for the status quo, and it’s not a status quo that is really sustainable in the long run. Yes, the Iranians can reduce the output of their oil production, can survive US naval blockade for a long period of time. Yes, the United States can live with higher energy prices and might not necessarily care much about what the closure of Strait of Hormuz would cause in terms of consequences around the world, food insecurity in East Africa and so on. It is also a very costly status quo for both sides, and they both would welcome the possibility of an off-ramp, but an off-ramp that doesn’t really take away most of their leverage because they still have not resolved anything in a substantive manner.
Now, you’re right in being concerned that if you don’t resolve the problems, you always risk that at some point down the road, tensions will flare up again, and we would end up exactly where we have been in another round of hostilities. That’s completely possible. This is why the framework agreement, as welcome as I think it is, despite all of its shortcoming, is not going to be a long-term solution. Neither side is really thinking long term here.
I think the Iranians would want to see what happens in the midterm elections, whether President Trump would be in a situation that his wings have been clipped next year as a result of the change in the balance of power in Washington, what happens in Israeli elections. The same for Israel and the United States. They want to wait and see what happens to an Iran that doesn’t have enough resources to fully recover and reconstruct after this war. Might have a bit of economic reprieve as part of this framework agreement, but certainly not enough for it to get back on its feet. There’s still a high degree of domestic discontent within the Iranian society. Would the regime be stable? Would it be in a weaker position?
Both sides, I think, will play for time and would see where things are next year. I do agree that the risks of getting into this cyclical conflict pattern is quite high because this framework is not going to resolve anything. Although both sides are giving each other a 60-day renewable window to negotiate the details of a comprehensive agreement, I don’t think we would ever get there.
Esfandyar
Ali, to round out the conversation on the negotiations as they’re unfolding right now, we’ve described this largely as talks between two sides. Of course, one of the very remarkable things about the way these talks are playing out is that pretty much every country in the region is a stakeholder or actually trying to have its influence felt in some ways.
On the spoiler side, the obvious example here is Israel, and we’ve talked a little bit about how Israel could decide to undermine the deal depending on its own priorities and imperatives. There are also countries that are seeking to defend diplomacy or create space for diplomacy. We have Pakistan, which helped broker the ceasefire, Qatar and Oman that have been playing a mediator, facilitator role, and then also regional power such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey that are trying to push the Trump administration towards treating diplomacy seriously. You could also maybe touch on the role of China.
When you look at all of these countries that are weighing in, in different senses on the talks, does that change your prognosis at all? We’ve talked about why, fundamentally, a framework agreement might be insufficient when it’s just the US and Iran. What if it’s bound into this larger regional understanding that this issue really needs to be kept in the box so that you don’t end up with another round of crisis?
Ali
Look, the reason everybody’s involved now is that all the predictions about how we would end up in a regional conflagration if this issue was not resolved in a mutually beneficial way, unfortunately, have come to pass. Everybody has now paid a price for this crisis. The region was, of course, caught in the crossfire, and they know that if this conflict resumes, it could spiral out of control in a way that the cost that the region has already suffered would pale in comparison to what could come next. This is why they’ve been very proactive in trying to bring Iran and the US to a point that they could at least agree to this very basic superficial framework of an understanding.
However, we’ve seen this movie before in Gaza, almost the exact same thing happened. That a lot of these major regional players came together and there was a major signing ceremony for the Gaza ceasefire deal, which never went into phase II, which never really fundamentally resolved the issues. Because at the end of the day, again, you’re dealing with a very peculiar administration that doesn’t have the focus, doesn’t have what it takes to bring issues to a stable and comprehensive solution.
I’m afraid this time around, despite the involvement of the region and countries, we’re not necessarily in a better position to be able to resolve these problems because of the nature of the Trump administration. That does not preclude include the possibility of the region trying to, once the dust settles in this conflict, to start its own initiative of engaging Iran and starting the much overdue conversation about a regional security architecture that is beneficial to all.
For that, you don’t necessarily need the Trump administration to be involved or even to provide a green light. Israel would always be opposed to it. But with so many regional countries more or less on the same page about what they want to get out of this diplomatic track, I think that’s where the real potential lies. It would be a pity if everybody waits for Washington because it will be like waiting for Godot. Washington will not arrive. The Trump administration after this will focus on Cuba, and again, we’ll get to the midterms. There might be political violence in the United.
There are all sorts of distractions that would prevent Washington from being able to play a constructive role. But that shouldn’t stop the region from pushing forward with what it has started, which for the first time is actually promising. I’m saying that clear-eyed with the fact that there are still some regional players like the UAE, for instance, who are not necessarily on board with this mutually beneficial integrated vision for the future of the region. But you don’t need to have everybody on board. The European system also didn’t start with everybody on board. You start with the critical mass and eventually everybody else sees the benefits in this cooperative and inclusive approach, they would join it.
Esfandyar
I’m glad we ended up with a slightly more optimistic outlook for the region. Ali, we’ve reached the end of our time, and I have to ask you the question we ask all first-time guests on the show. When did you realize that sanctions are changing the world?
Ali
I think it was in 2013 when I started talking to Iranian officials about sanctions relief, and I realized that they just don’t understand how complicated the structure of sanctions, especially US sanctions are, and started writing a crisis group report that we entitled the Spider Web. That was an education for myself too, because I just realized how sticky the nature of these sanctions are and how they’re easy relatively to design, but hard to enforce, but almost impossible to remove. That lesson has stayed with me now for almost 13 years.
Esfandyar
Ali, thank you for a brilliant examination of the factors behind these negotiations. I hope that the officials that you’re engaging with at least take on board some of your optimism about trying to find a silver lining here and maybe the region finding a way forward and realizing that the path to peace may not run through Washington.
Ali
Thanks. Fingers crossed.
Esfandyar
I’m Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, and this has been The Sanction’s Age. Our show is produced by media.winter in Berlin. Thanks for listening.
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